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Abstract 
Ulster-scots is a contemporary case of ethnicity-building, materialising in Northern Ireland at 
the end of the twentieth century. As the “Troubles” began to be reinterpreted as being about 
cultural identity in the 1980s, avenues were sought through which to find a “Protestant-ness” 
comparative to the considerably more developed discourse of Irishness. It was at this point 
that Ulster-Scots emerged. While its initial decades were marked by derision, hostility, and 
resistance, it has gained considerable ground in recent years. This article outlines the 
development of Ulster-Scots from its beginnings in the late 1980s to the present. Utilising in-
depth interviews with a variety of current and historical actors, I contend that this 
development entailed three phases. First, grass-roots educationalists operated independently 
while unionist elites lobbied for official recognition. In a second phase, the official 
recognition and institutionalisation of Ulster-Scots in the wake of the Good Friday 
Agreement initiated a process wherein the Ulster-Scots Agency came to be established as the 
key player in the field. A third phase began in the early 2010s with the Agency establishing a 
monopoly over the processes of Ulster-Scots peoplehood-making. 
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Ulster-Scots is a contemporary case of peoplehood construction, emerging as a 
discourse in the latter stages of an ethnically inflected civil war. It is demonstrative of the 
capacity of ethnically framed conflict to produce new identities and transform established 
ones (Brass, 2003; Brubaker, 2004), as well as the potential for peace-building processes to 
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provide openings for leverage-gaining by ethnic entrepreneurs. Across the political spectrum 
in Northern Ireland, Ulster-Scots has been viewed since its inception with suspicion, broadly 
understood to be an attempt to invent a Protestant language, culture and identity with which 
to compete with the discourse of Irishness. Hence, it has been described as a unionist weapon 
in Northern Ireland’s cultural war (Mac Póilin, 1999), and ‘a risible attempt to promote a 
marginally used tongue as a political gambit’ (Radford, 2001, p. 51). However, its inclusion 
in the Northern Ireland Agreement (“the Agreement” herein) in 1998 institutionalised the 
idea of Ulster-Scots in the form of the Ulster-Scots Agency. Although horizontal legitimation 
did not instantly follow its vertical affirmation and legal recognition (Níc Craith, 2000), 
Ulster-Scots has become an increasingly salient (Stapleton and Wilson, 2004) and socially 
accepted discourse in Northern Ireland. In recent years, it has become not unusual to hear 
anachronistic, even “everyday primordial” accounts of Ulster-Scots which place its origins in 
the mists of time. 
This article describes the development of the notion of Ulster-Scots identity in 
Northern Ireland from its beginnings in the late 1980s to the present. As a relatively new 
peoplehood movement, Ulster-Scots offers the opportunity to map the stages in the 
development of ethnic identity which has its origins in the late twentieth century. Whereas 
most ethnicities and nationalities experienced their period of “revival” in the nineteenth to 
early twentieth centuries, the Ulster-Scots movement has its origins in the last few decades. 
Drawing upon forty-two semi-structured interviews with a variety of current and historical 
actors, including political elites, teachers at Ulster-Scots Flagship schools, Ulster-Scots 
Agency workers, and others, I offer a concrete narrative of this development. I contend that 
this development entailed three phases: in the first, grass-roots educationalists operated 
independently, as unionist elites lobbied for recognition; in the second, the official 
recognition and institutionalisation of Ulster-Scots in the wake of the Good Friday 
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Agreement initiated a process wherein the Ulster-Scots Agency came to be established as the 
key player in the field; and, in the third, the Agency has been established as a monopoly over 
Ulster-Scots peoplehood.  
The notion of Ulster-Scots as a language, culture, and ethnic identity began to be 
discussed from the late 1980s. After the “Troubles” moved from the high-intensity violence 
of the seventies into more predictable patterns of low-intensity intractable conflict (White, 
1983; McKittrick et al., 1999), interpretations of the conflict began to undergo something of a 
cultural turn (Níc Craith, 2003; Gilligan, 2007; Finlay, 2010). Concerns over equal rights for 
Catholics and alternative solutions to the “constitutional question” gradually gave way to its 
description as, primarily, an ‘ethnically framed conflict’ (Brubaker, 2004, p. 166). While 
identity talk was ‘in the air’ in the 1970s, it was not until the cultural turn of the 1980s that it 
came to the fore (Gilligan, 2007, p. 602). In contrast to Irishness, Northern Ireland’s 
Protestant community’s apparent lacking a coherently articulated cultural identity was 
brought into sharp relief (Aughey, 1995; Finlay, 2001). It was in the wake of these social 
forces that the notion of Ulster-Scots began to take form. 
At the beginning of the nineties, Ulster-Scots began to be promoted by a small group 
of unionist and loyalist elites. Amid widespread public ridicule from both nationalists and 
unionists alike, the movement quickly gained official recognition through its inclusion 
alongside Irish in the Agreement ( Northern Ireland Agreement, 1998). In its wake, Ulster-
Scots gained not only official recognition, but its own governmental institution, the Ulster-
Scots Agency, and allocated considerable funding for its promotion. One of the core areas 
through which the Ulster-Scots Agency has aimed to promote Ulster-Scots in Northern 
Ireland has been through school-based education. While the Ulster-Scots Agency has been 
attempting to do so since its creation, it has gained greater reach and central coordination of 
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Ulster-Scots education through the 2010s. In doing so, the Agency has managed to gain a 
monopoly over the discourse and meaning of Ulster-Scots. 
This article contains five sections. In the first section, I discuss the theories of ethnic 
identity building utilised in this study. Second, I provide a brief outline of Ulster-Scots. The 
third section briefly sets out the methods utilised in undertaking the research, while the fourth 
details its findings. I conclude by discussing several tentative lessons for scholarship in 
peoplehood-building which can be drawn from the Ulster-Scots case.  
 
Peoplehood Building 
A multitude of definitions of, and distinctions between, different categories of 
peoplehood are found within the academic literature. Various distinctions between ethnic, 
national, racial, and other such categories (such as the conceptualisation of the nation as an 
ethnicity with a claim to statehood) and descriptions of their contents (such as language, 
culture, heritage, genes, physical features, shared values, and so on) exist and are utilised 
both societally and within the academic literature. However, as Brubaker (1996, 2004, p. 4) 
has effectively argued, just because these ‘groupist’ distinctions are frequently employed by 
such actors does not mean we should uncritically adopt these as our units of analysis. Rather, 
the content of these discourses should be included within our analysis. Wacquant (2016, p. 
1081) contends that this family of categorisations can be considered as subsets of “ethnicity,” 
as ethnicity itself ‘is defined by shifting and woolly criteria that operate inconsistently across 
institutional domains and levels of the class structure, such that it does not produce a 
coordinated alignment of boundaries in symbolic, social and physical space.’ This is not to 
say that societal conceptualisations of these various categories are not important; only that 
what differentiates them is neither constant nor absolute. 
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Rogers Smith (2003, 2015) offers a productive terminological and schematic way 
forward in this regard. Smith employs the term ‘peoplehood’ to encompass all forms of 
discourse where claims of being “a people” are made, ranging from small-scale organisations 
and local affiliations, through ethnic, national, and state identities, to international and 
universal affiliations. Given that differentiations between various forms of peoplehood are 
not pre-discursive, the maintenance of rigid boundaries between the study of the social 
construction of ethnicity, nationality, and other such forms is problematic. As such, regarding 
the particular case study in hand, I utilise theories of peoplehood-building originally intended 
for nationalism studies in order to analyse the construction process of a regional ethnic 
identity. 
In this article, I utilise and build upon Hroch’s (1985) A–B–C model of small nation 
formation. According to this model, national “revivals” develop by passing through three 
temporal phases. In the initial phase, the ‘period of scholarly interest,’ an association of 
concerned individuals, typically intellectuals, collect and study the (alleged) characteristics of 
the nation, such as its language, culture, and history (1985, pp. 22). In the second phase, the 
‘period of patriotic agitation,’ politically active groups lobby for greater public recognition of 
the national group and its idiosyncrasies (1985, p. 23). These patriots function as the ‘driving 
force’ in the construction of a mass national movement, organising in combinations with 
others ‘already dissatisfied with the limitation of interest to the antiquities of the land, the 
language and the culture,’ and who share their desire for the ‘spreading of national conscious 
among the people’ (1985, p. 23). A third phase is reached with the rise of a national mass 
movement. 
While Hroch’s model remains both productive and influential (Maxwell, 2010), his 
work is fundamentally groupist in its conception of nationalism. His analysis of the 
development of national movements largely assumes the basic building-blocks of the nation – 
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its identity, cultural features, historical narrative, and so on – to be essentially concrete 
realities prior to the national scholarship which purports merely to unearth them. Critics of 
such approaches argue that these various features ought to be considered products of 
invention (Hobsbawm and Ranger, 2012) and collage (Smith, 2003). In contrast to such 
groupist approaches, Brubaker (2004, p. 13) argues for the necessity of critically analysing 
how such notions of communal difference come to be ‘proposed, propagated, imposed, 
institutionalised, discursively articulated, organisationally entrenched, and generally 
embedded in multifarious forms of “governmentality”’.  
Hroch is by no means alone in focusing on powerful actors and/or groups in the 
construction of ethnic and national identities. Wimmer (2013, p. 69), for example, includes 
‘political mobilisation’ as one of his key means of ethnic boundary making. According to 
Wimmer, both the powerful and subordinate actors have the potential to ‘mobilize sections of 
a population in order to carry the weight of mass opinion into the public arena and to make 
their vision of the relevant ethnic divisions politically salient’ (2013, p. 69). Rogers Smith 
(2003, p. 32) also contends that processes of peoplehood-building involve a variety of actors; 
however, he argues that such mobilisations include ‘constrained, asymmetrical interactions 
between actual and would-be leaders of political communities and the potential constituents 
for whom they compete.’ As such, processes of peoplehood-building involve both the 
asymmetric, top-down power of elites and the simultaneous restraint of such elites as to 
which peoplehoods and narratives they can utilise in articulating the “people” they aim to 
describe. For Smith (2003, p. 34), these constraints include the pre-existing ‘senses of 
membership, identity, and affiliation, with entrenched economic interests, political and 
religious benefits, historical and cultural attachments, and animosities’ within the target 
population. As I discuss in more detail below, the rise of Ulster-Scots in Northern Ireland is 
very much in line with elite-centred descriptions of peoplehood-building. While both 
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grassroots actors and political elites have played roles in its creation, the process of ethnic 
narrative production has been fundamentally asymmetric, structured by political, economic 
and bureaucratic power differentials.  
In the case of Ulster-Scots, the separation of Hroch’s phases A and B is problematic 
both temporally and in terms of the overlap in personnel (and their interests). Scholarly 
interest has at no point been politically neutral in its construction. The process of ethnicity 
exploration and collaging was – and continues to be – primarily undertaken and moulded by 
political-cum-cultural actors. If separable at all, the primary period of “scholarly interest” has 
largely followed, rather than preceded, successful agitation. It was not until Ulster-Scots was 
allocated political, financial, and bureaucratic power in the form of the Ulster-Scots Agency 
that such an undertaking was adopted in earnest. 
An important difference between Ulster-Scots and the small nations utilised in 
Hroch’s analysis is the political-economic structure in which it arose. Hroch overlays his A–
B–C model upon several stages of political-economic development: pre/post bourgeois 
revolution and the rise of capitalism, the onset of the industrial revolution, and the rise of a 
working-class movement. In contrast, Ulster-Scots arose in the context of post-industrial 
capitalism, Thatcherite neoliberalism, and a civil-war economy. Between 1961 and 1991, the 
level of employment in the manufacturing sector in Northern Ireland had fallen by more than 
70 per cent, ‘while jobs in private services increased by 54% and employment in the public 
sector increased by a staggering 158%’ (Shirlow and McGovern, 1996, p. 393). By 1993, 
public financing from Westminster represented 35.8 per cent of Northern Ireland’s GDP, and 
the lack of employment opportunities was buttressed by a disproportionately large public 
sector. By the early 1990s, parity-of-esteem financing of ethno-cultural projects had become 
one of the most dependable mechanisms to funnel grants to ethnopolitical bases. For Hroch 
(1985, p. 23), Phase B is ‘made possible by the establishment of objective relations of 
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economic, political and other types’. As I discuss in more detail below, this was certainly the 
case for the rise of Ulster-Scots. 
Hacker-Cordon and Miley (2007) outline four key mechanisms described in the 
constructionist literature around national consciousness: nation-building from below, from 
above, and two from the ‘middle’ (bureaucracy monopoly and education-indoctrination). The 
former two represent, respectively, conceptualising the production of a national 
consciousness as evolving out from “the people” in a bottom-up process, and, second, as 
being constructed by ruling elite in a top-down process. In the latter conception, national 
consciousness develops from the middle. Bureaucracy monopoly exists where certain forms 
of linguistic or cultural capital are rendered advantageous on the labour market, leading to the 
construction of a national consciousness. An alternative form of nation-building from the 
middle comes from education-indoctrination, through the establishment of a ‘monopoly of 
legitimate education’ (Hacker-Cordon and Miley, 2007; Gellner, 2008, p. 33). In this article, I 
contend that gaining a monopoly over the sphere of education marked a key turning point in 
the ascendency of the Ulster-Scots Agency. Gaining sole patronage over its development and 
spread, the Agency has achieved considerable control over the Ulster-Scots peoplehood 
narrative into the future. However, the control of the Agency over Ulster-Scots education 
renders it more commensurate with top-down, rather than middle-out, processes. 
Having discussed the theoretical framework of the study, I now turn to the case study 
under consideration in this article: the Ulster-Scots movement.  
 
Ulster-Scots 
Ulster-Scots burst onto the Northern Irish political scene in the 1990s. It gained 
notoriety initially as a language, promoted as a long-subjugated dialect of Scots (Görlach, 
2000). The movement was also widely understood to be a conspicuous attempt to produce a 
Ethnicity Monopoly 
9 
 
Protestant linguistic equivalent of the Irish language (Mac Póilin, 1999; Níc Craith, 2000, 
2001; Radford, 2001; Crowley, 2006; Gardner, 2015). Its colloquial register and use of words 
previously considered to be local slang, combined with attempts to maximally differentiate its 
spelling from standard English (Mac Póilin, 1999), rendered it open to media scorn (McCall, 
2002). However, the derision of Ulster-Scots is not merely a response to its “folksiness,” but 
also to the apparent new-found interest many loyalists and unionists seemed to have suddenly 
developed in the fields of linguistics, cultural heritage and literary history. This opposition 
has been heightened further by the considerable flow of public finances apportioned to 
translation and funding. 
For many of its promoters, however, ethnic identity and cultural practice have always 
been central to the Ulster-Scots movement. However, pursuing linguistic legitimacy was 
considered to be the most immediate and potentially fruitful tactic for gaining cultural and 
ethnic legitimacy. Hence, the promotion of Ulster-Scots as a language took centre-stage 
through the 1990s and early 2000s, as Lee Reynolds, Information and Community Outreach 
Officer for the Heritage Council1, explained: 
There have been many attempts to define cultural rights, but whenever they have done 
they’ve found the language aspect much easier to define than the cultural. So, what 
began as a process of cultural rights recognition ended up language rights recognition 
with some cultural rights attached. As they examined the issue and tried to define it, it 
got reversed in what was the original intention. So, we ended up with a model where 
to secure our cultural rights we had to go heavy on the language rights.  
Hence, it has only been since Ulster-Scots gained linguistic recognition that it began to be 
promoted in earnest as an ethnic and cultural “revival.” This said, even amongst promoters 
and supporters of Ulster-Scots, its nature remains a highly contested notion. As one 
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interviewee stated, ‘Through all your research I’d be surprised if any two people say the same 
thing’ (Jane Wallace, Ulster-Scots Agency education officer). Broadly speaking, the division 
of interest between the cultural and the linguistic breaks down along class lines, with 
working-class engaging with the former and feeling alienated from the latter (McCall, 2002). 
 In terms of linguistic ability in Northern Ireland, according to the 2011 census 
(NISRA, 2013a, 2013b), the first census to include the question, 8.08 per cent of the 
population (around 140,000 people) claimed to have some ability in Ulster-Scots. By way of 
comparison, this figure for the Irish language was 10.65 per cent. Age, gender and religious 
profiles for Ulster-Scots also differ from that of Irish. Whereas ability in Irish is most 
prevalent among the young and least so for older age groups, Ulster-Scots linguistic ability 
was most common among the oldest age groups. One in four Ulster-Scots speakers are over 
the age of fifty-five. In terms of gender, males are more likely than females to have some 
ability in Ulster-Scots (53.1 and 46.9 per cent respectively), while the reverse is true for the 
Irish language for which 47.8 per cent are male and 52.2 female. The religious divide in 
linguistic ability is particularly stark. Of those with some ability in Irish, fully 90 per cent are 
Catholic and only 7.4 per cent Protestant. For Ulster-Scots, meanwhile, 79 per cent with some 
ability are Protestant, while Catholics make up 17 per cent. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
 Importantly, however, the level of Ulster-Scots linguistic ability does not necessarily 
correspond to the level of identification, and ‘a knowledge of the language is neither 
necessary nor sufficient for a sense of Ulster-Scots identity’ (Stapleton and Wilson, 2004, p. 
571). When the figures for Ulster-Scots linguistic ability are compared to that of espousing 
Ulster-Scots identity, the state of religious bifurcation becomes clearer. Comparing the 
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figures for self-identification from a 2010 Omnibus survey (Carmichael, 2010) to those for 
linguistic ability from the 2011 Census provides a rough insight into this divide. Whereas the 
figure for self-identification among Protestants was considerably higher than that of linguistic 
ability, for Catholics it appears likely that Ulster-Scots linguistic ability and self-
identification are more closely aligned (see table 1). This would seem to suggest that, in the 
absence of linguistic ability, Ulster-Scots identity resonates almost exclusively with 
Protestants in Northern Ireland. 
 Thus far, we have discussed the theoretical framework for peoplehood building 
employed in this study and outlined the key parameters of Ulster-Scots. In the following 
sections, I briefly summarise the methods utilised in undertaking this research and 
subsequently outline the findings of the study. 
 
Methods 
This paper forms part of a larger project analysing the evolution, content, and political 
significance of the Ulster-Scots movement. The empirical data utilised in this article include 
forty-two semi-structured interviews conducted between 2014 and 2016. Participants 
included twelve sitting MLAs2 within the Belfast assembly at the time, teachers from twelve 
Ulster-Scots Flagship (primary) schools, seven past and present staff members and associates 
at the Ulster-Scots Agency, three central figures active within the Ulster-Scots Heritage 
Council, and other actors involved in Ulster-Scots education. In terms of selection for 
participation, the MLAs interviewed represent the proportion who responded to the invite to 
participate in the research, sent to all MLAs at the time. The twelve schools included in the 
research were randomly selected from the twenty-four Northern Irish schools within the 
Ulster-Scots Flagship scheme at the time. Other interviewees were selected due to their 
involvement in the Ulster-Scots movement. The interviews touched on a variety of topics 
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relating to the development of, rationales for, and content of Ulster-Scots and Ulster-Scots 
education. All interviews were recorded, selectively transcribed, and organised thematically. 
The data pertaining specifically to the historical development of the Ulster-Scots movement 
was utilised to develop this article. 
 
Three Phases of Development  
Ulster-Scots education has been established through three phases of development. The 
initial phase involved the rise of disparate inclusions of folk-stories, music, poetry and 
literature by grass-roots educationalists starting perhaps as early as the latter years of the 
eighties. In parallel, unionist political elites had begun in this period to lobby for its official 
recognition and establishment at the governmental, legislative and programmatic level. A 
second phase, beginning with the Agreement and the creation of the Ulster-Scots Agency in 
1998-1999, involved the beginnings of interaction between grass-roots educationalist actions 
and centralised bureaucracy, of the provision of funding and educational materials, and its 
promotion by the Ulster-Scots Agency within schools previously outside of the purview of 
Ulster-Scots education. The early 2010s have heralded a third phase, in which grass-roots 
activists have become the minority in, and even at times excluded from, the mainstream of 
Ulster-Scots education. In this phase, the Ulster-Scots Agency fully monopolised and 
escalated the dissemination of the school-based teaching of Ulster-Scots. 
 
Phase One: Grass-Roots Education, Elite Lobbying 
The idea of Ulster-Scots began to disseminate through certain unionist currents of 
thought in the late eighties and early nineties. The Ulster-Scots Language Society was formed 
in 1992, producing the first publication explicitly about, and partly written in, Ulster-Scots 
the following year (Níc Craith, 2003; Gardner, 2015). In the final decade of the conflict, prior 
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to the signing of the Agreement in 1998, there emerged a small number of grass-roots 
educators who began to teach Ulster-Scots in schools. These educators were varied in 
approach, independent in action, and multifarious in their interest in the subject. Although I 
was informed of this through my interviews, only two participating interviewees stated that 
they were active in the pre-Agency period: Mr Robertson3 and Willie Drennan. Mr Robertson 
stated that his interest in doing so began in the mid-eighties and was centred largely around 
linguistic and literary interests, especially the work of W. F. Marshall and Robbie Burns. 
Although Mr Robertson claimed to have been teaching Ulster-Scots ‘for over 30 years,’ he 
remained ambiguous over whether or not the description of his earlier teaching as lessons “in 
Ulster-Scots” were retrospectively reconceptualised as such. Both Drennan and Mr Robertson 
expressed concern about the running of the Ulster-Scots Agency, both administratively and in 
terms of its conceptualisation of Ulster-Scots peoplehood (see Phase Three below).  
Willie Drennan is a prominent grass-roots Ulster-Scots promoter who engaged with 
Ulster-Scots education through this initial phase. Having developed a burgeoning interest in 
County Antrim localism whilst teaching folklore and traditional music to children in Canada 
through the nineties, Drennan returned to Northern Ireland to continue this project. Initially, 
he secured temporary funding from the Arts Council to provide Ulster-Scots education to 
schools through his “Ulster Folk Orchestra Association”. This constituted the first organised, 
funded educational project of its kind. According to Drennan, his funding was redirected after 
the establishment of the Ulster-Scots Agency at the behest of prominent individuals within 
the DUP. At least from his perspective, from the early 2000s, grass-roots Ulster-Scots 
education had begun to be taken captive by unionist political elites and centralised in the 
hands of the Ulster-Scots Agency. 
One of the central figures in the early establishment of the Ulster-Scots project at the 
political level was DUP MLA, Nelson McCausland. He had become involved with the 
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Ulster-Scots movement in 1992, and was instrumental in the launching of the Ulster-Scots 
Heritage Council three years later, acting as its first chairman and later as its director. The 
Heritage Council brought together ‘all the organisations which were in some way Ulster-
Scots-related … under one umbrella,’ in part due to a shared sense of marginalisation. One of 
the aims of the Heritage Council, after its creation in 1995, was the inclusion of Ulster-Scots 
into education, and much effort was directed toward lobbying for funding from the 
Community Relations Council, the Council for the Curriculum, and political elites directly. 
However, it was not until several years after the creation of the Ulster-Scots Agency that 
substantial resources for Ulster-Scots education were procured. In line with other 
interviewees, McCausland described incorporations of Ulster-Scots prior to this point as 
being ‘very much driven by the enthusiasm and the passion of a principal or a teacher.’ 
The Heritage Council was led by a small group ranging from those on the fringe to the 
centre of the unionist political elite. McCausland, who chaired the Council, had been elected 
in Northern Ireland’s 1989 local elections as an Independent Unionist, moving to the UUP in 
1993. Colin Robinson, who served as Cultural Outreach Officer, was an activist for the 
Progressive Unionist Party4, while Lee Reynolds, who became the Information and 
Community Outreach Officer, was at the time a member of the UUP, famously contesting 
James Molyneaux for the leadership of the party in 19955. In the nineties, Reynolds became 
active within unionism, contending for recognition of class inequalities, as well as for 
linguistic and cultural recognition of Ulster-Scots. In 2011, Reynolds replaced Ian Crozier to 
become one of the DUP councillors sitting on the Belfast City Council, while Crozier moved 
his current role of chief executive of the Ulster-Scots Agency. John Erskine and John 
McIntyre, known as the “twa6 Johns,” both founding members of the Ulster-Scots Language 
Society in 1992, were also central figures in the Heritage Council. So too were other Ulster-
Scots intellectuals, such as Dr Philip Robinson, author of Ulster-Scots: A Grammar of the 
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Traditional Written and Spoken Language (1997) and other books on Ulster-Scots language 
and history. Given the structural position of its personnel, the council had the capacity to 
wield considerable leverage in the political sphere at the time. The timing of their 
participation was also instrumental, taking place in the four-year period between the 1994 
ceasefires and the 1998 signing of the Agreement. The “two-community” model and the 
rhetoric of parity of esteem as central components of the peace process at the time meant that 
a “Protestant” language/culture to correspond to Irish(ness) was politically expedient 
(Gilligan, 2007). 
Subsequent to its creation in 1992, the Ulster-Scots Language Society began to 
produce its publication, Ullans, in which articles on Ulster-Scots heritage, culture and 
politics, linguistic and literary history, and new poetry, prose and translations from English 
were printed (Gardner, 2015). A central function of this publication was, essentially, to 
engage in Ulster-Scots ethnolinguistic apologetics. For Ulster-Scots, the creation of Ullans in 
the early nineties ‘essentially … constituted the initiation of a new print community’ (Níc 
Craith, 2003, p. 82). 
By 1998, Ulster-Scots had gained enough traction amongst unionist elites that it was 
put forward for inclusion in the Agreement along-side Irish. Article 3 of the Economic, Social 
and Cultural Issues section states: 
All participants recognise the importance of respect, understanding and tolerance in 
relation to linguistic diversity, including in Northern Ireland, the Irish language, 
Ulster-Scots and the languages of the various ethnic communities, all of which are 
part of the cultural wealth of the island of Ireland ( Northern Ireland Agreement, 
1998). 
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According to Lee Reynolds, this achievement “was basically down to us [the Ulster-Scots 
Heritage Council]. If we hadn’t been about four years previously, if we hadn’t been 
hammering on the doors, if we hadn’t been raising it – it would not have been there.” Much 
to the Heritage Council’s frustration, the wording of its inclusion within the Agreement 
extended to Ulster-Scots the same rights and protections as Irish, but fell short of granting it 
official recognition as a language. It would take subsequent years of lobbying to achieve this 
status. However, as Reynolds himself pointed out, the most fruitful outcome of the 
Agreement for promoters of Ulster-Scots was the establishment of the Ulster-Scots Agency: a 
governmentally funded institution constructed in order to facilitate the public promotion of 
Ulster-Scots. However, the dynamics underpinning the creation of the Agency were 
perceived by the Heritage Council as undesirable in both intention and results: 
The funding bodies didn’t want to recognise us and didn’t want to include us. We 
ended up with our own Agency because they wanted to basically just shove us in 
there and get us away from them. But … when somebody says you’re now going to 
get a million pounds spent on you, it’s a bit difficult to say, you know, what about all 
the other ones who aren’t spending tuppence on us. That has actually proven to be a 
longer-term problem where Ulster-Scots go to the Ulster-Scots Agency whereas Irish 
can go everywhere. We’ve been sort of pigeonholed in terms of recognition and 
funding. 
Indeed, perceived inequalities in funding and recognition between Ulster-Scots and Irish 
under consociational democratic governance have been a repeated source for claims of 
cultural discrimination by unionists and promoters of Ulster-Scots. However, the 
centralisation of Ulster-Scots activities into a single governmental agency, alongside the 
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comparative newness of Ulster-Scots in the sphere of language and culture, has rendered it 
comparatively much more organisationally concentrated than Irish.  
 In sum, this initial phase of peoplehood construction involved multiplicity in Ulster-
Scots. A variety of differing conceptualisations of it arose, and aspirations for it were diverse. 
While disparate grass-roots educators taught Ulster-Scots according to their own 
interpretations and emphases, unionist elites lobbied for official recognition. With the success 
of the latter in achieving its inclusion in the post-conflict governmental structure, Ulster-
Scots entered a new phase in its development. 
 
Phase Two: Centralisation 
The establishment of the Ulster-Scots Agency in 1999 produced a situation in which a 
fledgeling ethnic “revivalist” movement without a wide-spread base of popular support was 
apportioned considerable political and economic power. No mass movement preceded its 
instalment; on the contrary, vocal opposition to the idea of Ulster-Scots was widespread, even 
among much of its target population. Nor did there exist an established notion of what Ulster-
Scots should include. Its contours were unclear, and its core features rather multifarious.  
As a result of the Agency’s response to the situation it found itself in, this second 
phase in the development of Ulster-Scots involved three core elements: patriotic agitation, 
peoplehood scholarship, and centralisation. First, in the wake of its establishment, the Agency 
set about the business of increasing Ulster-Scots’ recognition, legitimisation and spread in 
identification at both official-legal and societal levels. Essentially, in Hrochian terms, the 
Agency began a process of ‘patriotic agitation’, campaigning for the societal recognition of 
Ulster-Scots culture, language, heritage, music and dance, and identity. Importantly, the 
Agency aimed to raise awareness not only at a broad societal level, but specifically among 
those whom they consider to be Ulster-Scots, practice its culture, and/or are native speakers. 
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A second core element of this second phase was the engagement in peoplehood 
scholarship. By “peoplehood scholarship” I mean something similar to what Hroch (1985, p. 
22) terms ‘scholarly interest’: the engagement in exploration, documentation, and 
systematisation of the nature, content, key features, and narrative of the sense of peoplehood 
in question (Hroch, 1985; Smith, 2003, 2015). However, where Hroch viewed this as a 
process of description, I contend that the process is far from mere discovery. Even though the 
actors themselves may believe in earnest that their activities merely represent a process of 
“finding” the features of the identity (and this certainly was the case for my participants), this 
process is, in fact, one of creative accumulation and collaging. It involves the amalgamation 
of various societal and historical features which can be legitimately claimed as being 
associated with the identity in question (Smith, 2003, 2015). For Ulster-Scots, this has mostly 
taken the form of anything associated with the “Protestant community” and/or connections 
between what is today Scotland and Northern Ireland. However, even by the time this 
research was carried out, 17 years after the creation of the Agency, there was little agreement 
over what constituted Ulster-Scots. As one of the education officers at the Agency stated: 
“Through all your research I’d be surprised if any two people say the same thing.” 
As described earlier, the Ulster-Scots case proceeded rather differently to Hroch’s 
schema in terms of temporality. Unlike in Hroch’s depiction, the phase of ‘scholarly interest’ 
did not precede its ‘patriotic agitation’ but occurred in parallel, often undertaken by the same 
actors. In other words, it was not (only) independent scholars who engaged in peoplehood 
scholarship, but politically active agents. Furthermore, with the dissemination of awareness 
of Ulster-Scots as the Agency’s central remit, peoplehood scholarship became 
professionalised, backed by governmental and financial support. In conjunction with having 
the economic and institutional structures to undertake this practice, the Agency had been 
rendered the official voice for Ulster-Scots. As such, the power to set the Ulster-Scots 
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peoplehood narrative became asymmetrically structured. Its peoplehood scholarship had 
become institutionally centralised.  
Third, and relatedly, this phase witnessed the gradual centralisation by the Agency of 
a broad spectrum activities which could legitimately be claimed as Ulster-Scots. Through this 
period, they began to provide funding for festivals, educational events, and community 
groups which the Agency deemed to be within the scope of Ulster-Scots culture, language, 
and heritage. The Agency also became particularly active and interested in the sphere of 
education, as it offered the potential not only to reach the next generation, but also to gain 
ground among the broader population. 
In 1999, John Laird was made both a UUP life peer and the first chair of the Ulster-
Scots Agency. Laird had been a member of the unionist elite since his election to parliament 
in 1970 and was later appointed to the position of Chair by David Trimble, then UUP leader 
and Northern Ireland’s first First Minister. With Trimble, Laird had been ‘a member of the 
Ulster Society for a quite considerable length of time’ and became interested in the Ulster-
Scots project in the early 1990s (Mac Póilin, 1999). According to Laird, much energy in the 
early years of the Agency was dedicated to fielding off opposition to Ulster-Scots throughout 
the island of Ireland. Laird described his own efforts in publically challenging alleged 
opposition to the Agency’s aims by the Irish government7 after the creation of the 
North/South Language Body8: ‘The first thing that I had to do was to confront the dislike of 
Ulster-Scots by the republicans … and the Dublin government.’ For Laird, however, these 
public clashes were instrumental in gaining traction amongst unionists in Northern Ireland: 
The Protestant, unionist community did what it always does, and that is: when it 
thinks the Dublin government is against it, then it must be alright. … I’m putting it 
very crudely, but that is it. If we could show that the Irish government were totally 
against what we were doing, then we were on the road to success, and the road to 
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getting a lot of people to support us, which is exactly what we did. Much to their 
considerable annoyance. I mean, the amount of restrictions they – the amount of work 
that they did to try and stop us was unbelievable, but it was too late – too late, too late 
– the genie was out of the bottle. 
Laird resigned from the post in 2004 over funding cuts to the Ulster-Scots Agency (BBC, 
2004), as well as in response to, in his words, the ‘considerable hammering from the Dublin 
government’ the Agency had allegedly received. 
Following Laird’s resignation, Mark Thompson was appointed to the position of 
chair. It would appear that this change in personnel was emblematic of something of a change 
in direction for the Agency. Most of the central decision-making figures within the Agency 
have had direct involvement in the political sphere in Northern Ireland. Thompson, by 
contrast, came from a background in graphic design, his trajectory into the Agency a result of 
‘doing some work with the Northern Ireland Office.’9 
Under Thompson, a more positive-slanted public relations strategy became the key 
focus of the Ulster-Scots Agency. A decade of media critiques in which Ulster-Scots was 
presented as being merely a mouthpiece for loyalist claim-making and an exploitation of the 
discourse of culture to express sectarian bigotry left the Ulster-Scots Agency wary of such 
connections. Indeed, the defensiveness and unease of participants from various spheres of 
Ulster-Scots promotion, both past and present, where any link to unionist-loyalist politics was 
raised during interviews is a testament to the continuing legacy of these concerns. With 
public relations increasingly to the fore, the Ulster-Scots Agency engaged in various 
strategies of marketing, drawing upon Thompson’s prior experience in graphic design. It 
disseminated information on a variety of platforms, including radio and TV, booklets and its 
webpage, showcase events, and it relocated its offices to create a “shop front” in Belfast. It 
began to engage more seriously in the development and dissemination of Ulster-Scots 
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education, funding and supplying educational materials, lessons in music and dance, and 
workers for schools, and running after-school clubs and annual summer schools. 
The “Ulster-Scots Project for Primary Schools” project had been established by the 
Agency at Stranmillis teacher training college in 2002, and in 2003 this remit was expanded 
to include a Post-Primary Project (Stranmillis, 2006). Through the mid to late 2000s, the 
Agency spent time ‘quality checking’ and promoting the use of the educational materials 
produced through Stranmillis, as well as working to disseminate and trial their use within 
schools. According to Thompson, their entry into schools was relatively smooth, initially 
concentrating their ‘limited resources on the places where the teachers were already on side’. 
However, in a turn common among Ulster-Scots promoters (Gardner, 2017), its low take-up 
rates were explained by an alleged ‘cultural characteristic of the Ulster-Scots community’ of 
being ‘quite relaxed, quite laid back.’ 
Contrarily, other interviewees from the Agency described methods taken to overcome 
a widespread suspicion and resistance they encounter within schools. These interviewees 
discussed the use of promotional events of various kinds in order to gain the trust of teachers 
of parents, as well as the interest of pupils. Gary Blair, an education officer in the Agency, 
explained the efficacy of a public engagement project in 2007 in achieving this: 
I think the mould was broke by a play called Fair Faa Ye ... it taul10 ye the story o’ 
Ulster-Scots from the earliest days tae modernity. … I think it opened the eyes o’ 
teachers I think every bit as much if not mair11 than the pupils. They were so taken by 
the content, and it made Ulster-Scots safe, and it made Ulster-Scots interesting, and it 
made it educationally inviting. 
It was through this period of public relations that the Ulster-Scots Agency began to gain 
ground in terms of school-based engagement.  
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 Over this period, the Agency began to establish communication with isolated grass-
roots Ulster-Scots educationalists, offering assistance, support and funding. Through this 
process, various grass-roots actors began to be co-opted into the terrain of the Agency’s 
reach. Willie Drennan, for example, was employed by the Agency to continue his work 
visiting schools, speaking and performing at assemblies, and running workshops. He 
presented an Ulster-Scots educational programme for the BBC entitled A Danner Wi 
Drennan in 2008, which included documenting some of his school visits. Through the 2000s, 
the Agency also began to work with teachers who were already informally discussing Ulster-
Scots ideas in their lessons, such as Mr Robertson (see above). 
 The experience of the Agency in its first decade was rather mixed. While gains were 
made in terms of their acceptance and visibility socially and within the education sector, it 
was also marked by various scandals, such as the arrest of the first chief executive, John Stan 
Mallon, in 200212 (The Herald, 2002), Lord Laird’s alleged spending of hundreds of pounds 
on taxis between Belfast and Dublin (Gordon, 2005), and the misuse of funding scandal 
(BBC NI, 2009). While this period was characterised by parallel actions by the Ulster-Scots 
Agency and other actors, anxieties over the increasing control of the former were palpable 
among grass-roots interest groups. This concern was vocalised in the editorial to the 2004 
edition of Ullans (2004), contending that the Agency ‘should in no way be confused with any 
of the Ulster-Scots community-based groups. … [Our] members will be aware that the 
recruitment criteria for Agency staff … cannot be expected to produce specialist, committed 
and interested staff.’  
 Despite these various issues, the Agency was able to gain considerable ground in 
terms of patriotic agitation, peoplehood scholarship, and centralisation over the course of this 
decade. Since 1999, considerable governmental funding has been allocated to the Agency, 
most notably with the promise of £12 million over five years in the 2005 budget, and the 
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further boost of three million over three years in the wake of the St Andrews Agreement in 
2006 (DCAL, 2014; Northern Ireland Executive, 2008). In terms of public engagement, 
perhaps the most effective area was found to be in the field of education. While developments 
in this area were relatively gradual, they laid the groundwork for the production and 
implementation of the large-scale, centrally coordinated educational schemes of the 2010s. At 
this point, the Ulster-Scots movement entered a third phase in which the Agency gained 
unequivocal dominance in the process of peoplehood-building and a monopoly over 
education. 
 
Phase Three: Ethnicity Monopoly 
Since the early 2010s, the Ulster-Scots Agency has gained a monopoly over Ulster-
Scots peoplehood. Where the second phase involved the coexistence of parallel and 
multifarious Ulster-Scots projects, the third phase is characterised by the ascendancy of the 
Agency. The three elements of the Agency’s actions in the second phase – patriotic agitation, 
peoplehood scholarship, and centralisation by the Ulster-Scots – continued to be undertaken 
in the third, but from a position of dominance. In the sphere of peoplehood scholarship, for 
example, the Agency still engages in considerable exploration; however, much of the ground-
work, directionality, and core principles for this were established in the 2000s. 
Considerable asymmetry exists in the designating the contours of Ulster-Scots 
language, culture, heritage, and identity. For, example, the Agency’s 2014-2016 Corporate 
Plan lists as one of their four strategic aims that it ‘will identify, interpret and animate Ulster-
Scots heritage, language and culture’ (Ulster-Scots Agency, 2014, p. 11). This declaration is 
also stated on the guidelines accompanying the Ulster-Scots funding application form 
(Ulster-Scots Agency, 2018). With all publically funded Ulster-Scots projects applying for 
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sponsorship centrally, the Agency now wields considerable bureaucratic power over deeming 
the meaning and content of Ulster-Scots peoplehood. 
This third phase has involved considerable advancements in the production and 
implementation of Ulster-Scots education. By the end of the 2000s, the Agency had begun to 
introduce more concrete schemes for educational provision, such as the Peripatetic Tutor 
Programme (PTP) in 2008. This programme provided lessons in traditional music and both 
Highland and Scottish Country dancing to schools across Northern Ireland (Campbell, 
Eydmann and Gunn, 2013). In terms of substantive education, the inclusion of Ulster-Scots in 
the education system through the 2000s and early 2010s had been almost entirely primary-
school based. Beyond its inclusion as a topic in “Local and Global Citizenship”, the 
introduction of Ulster-Scots into secondary schools would necessitate the construction of a 
full Ulster-Scots curriculum as a formalised subject. 
In November 2012, however, the Agency launched the Ulster-Scots Flagship Schools 
Award, awarded to (Primary) schools who ‘demonstrate eighteen continuous months 
commitment to Ulster-Scots in school life’ (Ulster-Scots Agency, no date). The Flagship 
scheme represents the most concrete and ambitious Ulster-Scots educational programme to 
date, establishing routine and continuous Ulster-Scots education within a specified number of 
schools under their purview. Much of the education is undertaken directly by the Agency 
within the schools, through after-school projects, school plays, school trips, special 
assemblies, and even specific classroom-based lessons. Other lessons are delivered by 
teachers within the school, informed by the materials and guidelines provided by the Agency. 
Subjects offered in the Flagship scheme include history and heritage, culture, literature and 
poetry, theatrical performance, language, and music and dance. By the spring of 2014, a 
small number of primary schools had received the Flagship Schools Award, and a further 
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forty-four were either working towards it or on the waiting list having applied to join (Ulster-
Scots Agency, no date; Campbell, Eydmann and Gunn, 2013; NSMC, 2013). 
The Ulster-Scots Flagship scheme marked a turning point in the educational 
monopolisation of the Agency over the Ulster-Scots peoplehood narrative and discourse. 
Grass-roots Ulster-Scots educators were joined by others who relied much more heavily on 
the Agency for teaching, materials, and information. Almost all of the teachers from Ulster-
Scots Flagship schools interviewed for this research were in the latter category, most of 
whom expressed having little to no prior knowledge of Ulster-Scots before engaging with the 
Agency. While almost all such teachers expressed a sense that it reflected the culture of the 
school’s “community”, many of the primary rationales provided for joining the Ulster-Scots 
Flagship project were economic. In the context of austerity, the free educational services 
offered by the Agency were viewed as means of alleviating restraints in school budgets. 
Ulster-Scots education in these schools was undertaken almost exclusively by the Agency. As 
Ms Anderson, a participating teacher from a Flagship school explained, her approach was to 
‘let the children learn about their culture … from the professionals, as such, rather than us.’ 
As school engagement began to increase rapidly through the 2010s, the Agency began 
to expand its aims. Trina Somerville, the Agency’s Director of Education and Language, 
described their recent turn toward a more assertive strategy. 
We’re at the stage where we’re talking to the Department of Education, we’re going 
to be meeting CCEA, and we’re going to be looking then to say you need to get the 
message out to schools to say this has to happen, this is happening. Because, you 
know, its fine for us to look at courses and to look at subjects where it can be 
embedded, but we need the buy-in and the support from the department of education 
saying: yes, this is good – this has to be done.  
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A central aim of the Agency for the future of Ulster-Scots education was its wholesale 
inclusion across all levels, including a GCSE and A-Level in ‘Ulster Scots language, heritage 
and culture.’ This latter aim was, indeed, announced by the Department of Culture, Arts and 
Leisure in 2012 (Meredith, 2012); however, interviewees at the Agency recognised this as a 
somewhat distant ambition. Nonetheless, dominance in the arena of peoplehood-building has 
been firmly established by the Agency, having consolidated its position as the sole body 
providing Ulster-Scots educational services. In doing so, it has gained a monopoly over the 
knowledge and narratives about Ulster-Scots within schools: a step in the direction of 
‘education-indoctrination’ in peoplehood production (Hacker-Cordon and Miley, 2007). 
It would appear that grass-roots actors within the Ulster-Scots movements have been 
largely excluded, pushed to the margins, or assimilated into the Agency. Grass-roots 
educationalists interviewed as part of this research expressed feelings of alienation toward to 
Agency and concern over its orientation. Mr Robertson contended that he had ‘very little 
faith in the Ulster-Scots Agency,’ critiquing it for its alleged disorganisation, financial 
mismanagement, and conceptualisation of Ulster-Scots. As he saw it, the problem with the 
Agency is that ‘they want to politicise it and make it Protestant.’  
Willie Drennan also expressed a variety of concerns regarding both the running of the 
Agency and its approach to Ulster-Scots. Regarding the former, he viewed the organisation as 
overly ‘top-down’ in its approach, excluding non-Agency voices: ‘they’re the “experts”, and 
I’m just a boy on the ground, you know’. In relation to the content of Ulster-Scots, Drennan 
critiqued the Agency for what he perceived as a disconnect between the “real” cultural 
history of the region and the official version of Ulster-Scots being promoted by the Ulster-
Scots Agency: 
It’s all sort of … plastic paddie. … It’s fair enough that they would promote Scottish 
Country dance because there was a wee bit of that, I suppose – maybe a dozen people 
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did it in the 1900s. … But the traditional dance that they should’ve been promoting 
was known as “country dancing.” … Every area from North Down and Antrim, the 
main social activity was these dances, in a big barn or a big front room of a house, or 
a local hall, that’s what people did … That was real, you know – that was our cultural 
tradition. And yet, because it didn’t have “Scotland” to it, you know. I mean, this is 
the thing on the image – [for the Agency] it’s all about Scotland, but it [should be] 
about what we did here. 
In other words, Drennan felt that the ideology underpinning the principles of peoplehood 
scholarship undertaken by the Agency differed from his own approach, silencing alternative 
peoplehood narratives. 
Due to a variety of disagreements between Drennan, the Agency, and the unionist 
political elite, his connection to the Agency was ended in 2009. Drennan viewed this as a 
deliberate move by the Agency to remove him from being ‘the face of Ulster-Scots’ as, 
according to him, he ‘didn’t fit into their agenda,’ ‘don’t align with any political party,’ and 
‘didn’t fit into their ideal of what an Ulster-Scot should be doing.’ Hence, Drennan found 
himself excluded from the Ulster-Scots educational project through the 2010s. For Mr 
Robertson, while the school in which he teaches continues to be incorporated within the 
Ulster-Scots Flagship scheme, he expressed feelings of alienation from the Agency. He 
expressed the view that, especially in recent years, his perspectives on Ulster-Scots had been 
pushed to the margins. 
In sum, since the early 2010s, the Ulster-Scots movement has become a highly 
centralised and institutionalised project, with the Agency holding a monopoly over the 
process of ethnicity-making. Although the institutional structures necessary for this ethnicity 
monopolisation were established with the GFA and the subsequent creation of the Ulster-
Scots Agency, it was not until the early 2010s that the latter established the scope of their 
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activities, gained dominance in the sphere of Ulster-Scots peoplehood-making activities, and 
achieved the operational capacity necessary for their monopolisation of the field. With 
Ulster-Scots education now entirely under the jurisdiction of the Agency, it wields 
considerable power to write the Ulster-Scots peoplehood narrative for the next generation, as 
well as to render it normative as a conception of group boundaries in Northern Ireland. 
 
Conclusion 
 This article has provided an in-depth analysis of a contemporary case of ethnicity-
building. From this research, I suggest that two tentative lessons may be deduced for the 
study of peoplehood-building processes. First, the substantive elements of Hroch’s three 
phases were found to be useful in considering the rise of a peoplehood. These elements are: 
scholarly interest, patriotic agitation, and mass movement. Drawing on the work of Rogers 
Smith (2003, 2015), as well as that of Hroch, I use the term “peoplehood scholarship” to 
describe the process of inventive collage through which various cultural features, both 
historical and current, are “discovered” to be elements of the identity under question. For 
Ulster-Scots, this has largely involved uncovering and appropriating a broad spectrum of 
local features which have resulted from the connections between the province of Ulster and 
Scotland. 
Second, Hroch’s conceptualisation of peoplehood-building as developing through 
temporal phases was also found to be effective. Certain moments and turning points in the 
lifespan of peoplehood projects establish new realities and shift the potentialities for their 
development and dissemination. For Ulster-Scots, these turning points were its inclusion in 
Northern Ireland’s peace accord and post-conflict institutional structure at the end of the 
1990s, and the firm establishment of the Agency’s monopoly over the peoplehood narrative 
in the early 2010s. However, it is important to point out that the precise phases which Hroch 
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outlined were not found to be the case for Ulster-Scots. Scholarly interest did not precede 
patriotic agitation, nor were these activities undertaken necessarily by different actors. 
Rather, these features occurred simultaneously, with peoplehood scholarship gaining 
considerable pace after the creation of the Agency. In fact, locating and appropriating 
allegedly “Ulster-Scots” features – its cultural characteristics, historical figures, heritage 
objects, standardised linguistic rules, ethnic idiosyncrasies, and so on – became a necessity 
for its everyday functioning.  
Hence, drawing upon Hroch’s model, I suggest that outlining turning points and 
phases is an effective strategy for modelling the processes of peoplehood-building, 
specifically focusing on the variety of competing peoplehood conceptualisations produced, 
the mechanisms through which certain versions become dominant while others are excluded, 
the political and social outcomes of patriotic agitation, and the different structural positions 
from which peoplehood scholarship is undertaken. Smith (2003) rightly points out the need to 
analyse power asymmetries in peoplehood-making. In line with this approach, this research 
suggests that describing the evolution and formation of such asymmetries will be effective for 
explaining how certain notions of collective identity come to be rendered hegemonic. 
The Ulster-Scots movement has resulted in a highly centralised, top-down structure, 
with the Agency exercising a monopoly over the definition of its content and contours. 
Furthermore, having become the only player in the production of Ulster-Scots education, the 
Agency has gained a ‘monopoly of legitimate education’ (Hacker-Cordon and Miley, 2007; 
Gellner, 2008, p. 33). As the influence of the Agency continues to grow, and its reach 
extends, Ulster-Scots peoplehood may yet become an unquestioned discourse, or even an 
ethno-cultural “mass movement.” 
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1 The Ulster-Scots Heritage Council was an association of Ulster-Scots-promoting groups, formed in 1995 (see 
also Níc Craith, 2003).  
2 Members of Legislative Assembly. 
3 All names of people and places associated with specific schools were anonymised. 
4 The PUP is a leftist party aiming to represent working-class, loyalist areas. 
5 Doing so out of a discontent with the UUP’s leadership at the point of the Downing Street Declaration of 1993. 
6 Two. 
7 In reality, it would appear that this largely took the form of accusations being publicly leveraged against the 
Irish government by Lord Laird himself (see, for example, Millar, 2000; Tanney, 2001). 
8 This is a council which was formed in the wake of the Northern Ireland Agreement. It involves two agencies: 
Foras na Gaeilge (the agency responsible for the promotion of the Irish language throughout the island of Ireland) 
and the Ulster-Scots Agency. 
9 The Northern Ireland Office is the department of the British government responsible for Northern Irish affairs. 
10 Told. 
11 More. 
12 John Stan Mallon was arrested and charged in relation to a child sex offence. 
                                                 
